True Enough: That Time Sam Harris & Jordan B. Peterson Couldn’t Agree on ‘Truth’
Two people, in conversation, possessing two opposing ideas of what’s true is nothing new. In fact, that’s just about any argument. Such a moment has likely happened to us all, at one time or another. It should be no surprise then when it happens to Sam Harris & Jordan B. Peterson during their first public discourse on the prior’s podcast series, Making Sense with Sam Harris back in January 2017. However, the two were stuck on a particular aspect of truth and epistemology that lasted almost two hours. Listeners were subjected to a conversational stalemate punctured into the discussion when the claim was seemingly introduced that if the outcome of something true led to something really bad, then that truth was not true enough — And thereby somewhat false.
From there on the discussion was tripped up in a topical language-game of sorts, in attempts to box in a uniform application of truth. Anyone tuning in anticipating a broader discussion of God, atheism, mythology, and ethics — For which these speakers are known to have somewhat opposing views — Indeed proceeded no further than this fork in the road. Yet, having re-listened to this episode, and this time knowing what to expect, I found myself focused on why the two seemed to be talking past one another and even more significantly, the importance of the wrinkle they were attempting to iron out before moving on.
It should be stated that Peterson more so than Harris, was willing to move on and at a few instances attempted to slip into broader territory. But Harris, like a vigilant bouncer, held him at the door. He seemed adamant at pinning down an admission from Peterson that truth does not require a good outcome, which Harris insisted — And Peterson failed to reasonably deny — Was Peterson’s claim.
The supposed claim was then anchored to Peterson through the use of countless examples proposed by Harris. These conceptual dramatizations were meant to illustrate instances in which the fact of a truth remains unchanged regardless of whether or not that truth is harmful. For instance, a situation where knowing if one has an even or odd number of hair on one’s body may or may not save that person’s life. A ridiculous situation, Harris admits but it nontheless works to show that irregardless of whether it has a favorable outcome, the number of hair on one’s body remains the same. In another example, Harris sketches the scenario in which a gunman is loose in Toronto and upon assaulting citizens, asks them to list all the U.S. Presidents from first to most recent in sequential order. Failure to do so correctly results in being shot. With the added detail that the gunman himself, has the sequence wrong and so in this case, a specific false answer saves your life and the right sequence will possibly get you killed. Neither however changes the fact that there is only one true sequence to the list of U.S. Presidents.
It’s actually impressive how many times Harris comes up with these kinds of scenarios in real time, a credit to his ability to reason which in my opinion disarmed Peterson and ultimately misrepresented Peterson’s position. These micro-examples, as Peterson refers to them, work in a contextually controlled way to illustrate exactly what Harris is saying without him having fully understood what Peterson was saying. Peterson was admittedly not as clear as Harris but did eventually offer an example to help identify his position in the form of a house that’s on fire. In this situation, someone within the burning house, fails to understand this truth because the room in which they find themselves, is not on fire.
This distinction between local truth and expanded truth is very important to Peterson. Understanding the significance it has for him helps us see why Harris’ examples have nothing to do with what Peterson is talking about. Because where Harris focuses on whether the amount of hair on one’s body remains true, Peterson on the other hand, is interested only in so far as there is a conflict between local and expanded truth. If for instance, permanently removing all the hair on one’s body is proposed to save people from the 50% chance of having the fatal amount of hair, but the effort proves futile because in fact, it’s the follicles that are being counted — Then the proposal, Peterson would say, was based on a truth that wasn’t true enough.
Likewise in the scenario with the gunman, Harris highlights the sequence of U.S. Presidents as the truth, while for Peterson, the gunman and his M.O. would be the point of interest. The observer of this truth can share this information, in order to advise citizens in Toronto to learn and memorize the list of U.S. Presidents in sequential order. The list is the local truth. The observer would stress it’s in the citizens’ best interest to have that list ready in mind. But if this observer failed to realize the gunman has a false sequence, that, being the expanded truth, then the observer’s utility of that local truth was not true enough and thereby would result in undesirable consequences (being shot).
So why does it matter? Who cares about whether a person has an even or odd number of hair on their body; or if they can’t tell a house is on fire, if the room they’re in, isn’t? Well the reason Peterson brought it up was to draw a distinction between the perspectives of himself, a pragmatist and Harris, a realist. Quite predictably, these labels inform how both react to defend their respective positions. Harris maintains real is real and shouldn’t, and factually can’t, be warped to fit any untruthful preference. While Peterson guards the position, reality is experienced subjectively and so it’s how we use the shared truth we can extract from it that’s important. I don’t think either view is wrong. I do, however, wish Harris had understood Peterson, or Peterson better communicated his point to Harris so the two could pick up from there and discuss where, when and how each view might serve us better. But as anyone knows, who has ever been in an argument where a point is misunderstood, it can be very hard to get pass such a moment. Me in either of their shoes would have tripped up way worse. It’s much easier to write about it from the perspective of the bleachers, where the game looks slower, smaller and in view within the full parameter of the playing field.
Harris gives another micro-example centered around a smallpox lab, it reoccurs in various points of their conversation but by the end, the scenario describes two laboratories, one working to cure smallpox, the other to weaponize it. The intention of either lab has no bearing on the truth of the molecular structure of smallpox, which remains as is, no matter what the labs do with it. Once again the context to which Harris pins his example, offers no conflict between local and expanded truth but is closer than any of the others he’s given to getting there.
If Harris had given Peterson’s example of the burning house, I’d wager he would have positioned ‘fire’ as the truth in question, instead of whether one should judge if a house is burning by whether or not a room is burning — Because of course, fire remains truly fire whether its in your fireplace, as a friend against the cold, or burning down your home like a nefarious enemy. And just as a person may burn down their own house if they don’t have the full expanded truth of what fire can do beyond keeping a fireplace warm, so too, we must question whether it’s wise to synthesize smallpox when there are those in society who might take that same information to weaponize it.
But this is precisely where things could get interesting in discussing the difference between a pragmatic and realist perspective. Because a cure for smallpox is desirable. Should we deny any similar research because of the possibility of those who may weaponize it? Leaving those who are sick or may become sick, vulnerable and unaided despite the possibility it may not be necessary? If we do proceed with a cure, how do we safeguard against nefarious intentions? Will we even attempt to balance out the decision to synthesize and study a potential biological weapon with real efforts to foster a world that has such global kinship that less and less among it wish to hurt one another?
What’s the wisest way to choose a beneficial local truth and actively work toward nullifying the possibility of a devastating expanded truth? In other words, if there’s no fire in the room I’m in, how do I install fire alarms in the hall so that my awareness of the house goes beyond my immediate vicinity?
Context matters. Moreover, the context to which we apply understandings of possibly short-sighted truths really matter. In our world, where technology, communication, and scientific inquiry move at such high velocities, perhaps more grace in how we venture into the unknown is needed more than ever. Ensuring that the constant outpour of new ideas and truths about our reality are not in fact, moving too fast for us to fully grasp their proper place in our society.
But equally important are our tools for measuring and reasoning what’s more likely to be true than false — Using discernment to distinguish between a variety of seemingly true things. And as we gauge the proper place for new ideas in our collective reality, it would seem unwise to be informed more so by unproven, untestable intuitions, strong as they may be, against material recurring facts. What we prefer to be true cannot stand in place of what is actually more true (via observation, evidence, etc.). Failure to recognize this may result in dire consequences when two “truths” valued equally, are in direct opposition.
For all its awkwardness, the conversation — As frustrating as it may have been to both Harris and Peterson — Was the start of an important dialogue we should attempt more often — Essentially, it’s an argument about whether it’s wiser to be realistic or practical. Or rather, in what cases is one approach wiser than the other? Or how, in some other cases, do we reconcile both into one wiser solution? It’s worth considering, then, that maybe the reason the conversation between Harris and Peterson was so clunky is precisely because we don’t practice talking about it enough. The more we put it off, the more we’re missing out. And the more we miss out, the more likely our truths might not be true enough.
